Monetary policy predictability in the euro area: an international comparison by Wilhelmsen, Bjørn-Roger & Zaghini, Andrea
WORKING PAPER SERIES
NO. 504 / JULY 2005
MONETARY POLICY
PREDICTABILITY 
IN THE EURO AREA
AN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISON
by Bjørn-Roger Wilhelmsen 
and Andrea Zaghini In 2005 all ECB 
publications 
will feature 




NO. 504 / JULY 2005
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=750784.
MONETARY POLICY
PREDICTABILITY 







of the Banca d'Italia and the Norges Bank.
2   Norges Bank,Bankplassen 2,0107 Oslo,Norway;Tel +47-22-316744;Fax +47-22-316050;




1   We would like to thank Tom Bernhardsen,Nuno Cassola,Francesco Drudi,Hans-Joachim Klöckers,Michele Manna, Wolfgang Modery,
Marcello Pericoli,Jorge Sicilia,an anonymous referee and participants to the XIII Tor Vergata Conference on Banking and 
Finance for very helpful suggestions and discussions.The paper does not necessarily reflect the views © European Central Bank, 2005
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Reproduction for educational and non-
commercial purposes is permitted provided
that the source is acknowledged.
The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB
Working Paper Series is available from










2 Are policy meetings’ days different days? 8
3 Predictability around policy decisions 11
3.1 The hit-rate 11
3.2 The money market adjustment 16
4 Market anticipation and pass-through




European Central Bank working paper series 31Abstract
The paper evaluates the ability of market participants to anticipate monetary policy
decisions in the euro area and in 13 other countries. First, by looking at the magnitude and
the volatility of the changes in the money market rates we show that the days of policy
meetings are special days for financial markets. Second, we find that the predictability of the
ECB’s monetary policy is fully comparable (and sometimes slightly better) to that of the
FED and the Bank of England. Finally, an econometric analysis of the ability of market
participants to incorporate in the current money rates the expected changes in the key policy
rate shows that in the euro area policy decisions are anticipated well in advance.
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JEL Classification: E4, E5, G1
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July 2005Historically, for a variety of reasons, Central Banks have chosen different ways of
communicating with the public and have relied on different instruments to be transparent.
However, the modern monetary policy literature has stressed the importance of a clear
understanding of Central Bank’s actions by financial markets in the formation of
expectations about future interest rates developments. This is so because correct
expectations help the Central Bank in its conduct of the monetary policy. While Central
Banks only control short-term interest rates, theory and empirical evidence indicate that
longer-term interest rates and arbitrage conditions in financial markets matter the most
for the transmission of monetary policy impulses to the economy. Longer-term interest
rates, in turn, reflect expectations of future short-term rates and the credibility of the
Central Bank. Hence, successful monetary policy is to a large extent a matter of shaping
market expectations about the way in which short-term rates are likely to evolve not only
in the period leading to the next policy decision but also later on.
This paper analyses the predictability, i.e. the ability of financial markets in anticipating
monetary policy decisions, of 14 different Central Banks with various monetary policy
frameworks and different ways of communicating to the public.
Using money market rates at different maturities we reached two results. First, by
comparing measures of the magnitude and the volatility of the changes in the money
markets rates, we showed that the days in which policy decisions are taken are special
days for financial markets. Second, according to two different measures of predictability
and via an assessment of the ability of financial agents in incorporating well in advance
the policy decisions into market rates, we showed that the overall predictability of the
ECB is in line with that of our two “benchmarks”: the FED and the Bank of England.
The two different measures of predictability are based on the money market behavior in
the days of policy meetings. First, we calculated the movements in financial markets rates
relative to a given benchmark that divides the monetary policy announcements into
“correctly anticipated” and “surprises”. Second, we estimated the financial markets
reaction to monetary policy moves. In particular, this analysis enabled us to exactly
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July 2005“(…) the effectiveness of monetary policy depends as much
on the public’s expectations about future policy as upon the
bank’s actual actions. Hence it is important not only that a
Central Bank manages to make the right decision as often as
possible, but that its action is predictable” (Woodford 2003).
1.  Introduction
The modern monetary policy literature has stressed the importance of a clear
understanding of Central Bank’s actions by financial markets in the formation of
expectations about future interest rates developments. This is so because correct expectations
help the Central Bank in its conduct of the monetary policy. While Central Banks only
control short-term interest rates, theory and empirical evidence indicate that longer-term
interest rates and arbitrage conditions in financial markets matter the most for the
transmission of monetary policy impulses to the economy. Longer-term interest rates, in
turn, reflect expectations of future short-term rates and the credibility of the Central Bank.
Hence, successful monetary policy is to a large extent a matter of shaping market
expectations about the way in which short-term rates are likely to evolve not only in the
period leading to the next policy decision but also later on.
Market participants’ ability to predict future monetary policy decisions is often viewed
as a direct consequence of the Central Bank’s transparency. A transparent overall monetary
policy framework is therefore seen as highly desirable. This has come to be widely accepted
by Central Bankers over the past decade. It is also acknowledged that a credible and
predictable Central Bank can achieve its objective with smoother interest rate movements
and at lower interest rate levels than a Central Bank with lower credibility.
1
In this paper we would ideally like to evaluate the degree of financial markets
understanding of the conduct of monetary policy (i.e. the Central Bank predictability) by
investigating the extent to which market expectations of the future development in the key
policy rates are in line with the view of Central Banks at every point in time. This is however
                                                        
1 Since the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism depends heavily on the ability of
monetary policy to affect the course of interest rates through financial market expectations, it is often argued
that monetary policy should induce “rule like” behaviors on the part of market participants (see for instance
Issing, 1999). This leads them to react to new developments in a manner consistent with the monetary policy
strategy, thus aiding the smooth conduct of the monetary policy.
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predictable in the past, which is exactly the aim of the paper.
The economic literature has proposed several ways to measure the predictability of
Central Banks, ranging from survey and case-study approaches to statistical/econometric
techniques (sometimes model-based) analyzing the development in the money market
interest rates. However, given that perfect predictability may not be attainable, it should not
be taken as the benchmark. In this respect, a cross country comparison offers a number of
advantages, including the possibility to examine the Central Bank’s predictability across
countries (and currency unions) with distinctive monetary policy frameworks and
communication strategies. Trying to take advantage of this possibility, although the focus of
the paper is on the performance of the ECB relative to that of the FED and the Bank of
England, we examine the ability of financial markets to correctly anticipate policy
announcements in 14 Central Banks -- from both industrialized and emerging market
economies -- over the past 5 years using the changes in 1-, 3- and 12-month money market
rates on the days of monetary policy meetings.
The heterogeneous sample we consider in this paper requires rather direct measures of
predictability that can easily be applied to all the countries. The examination covers four
different methodologies. In Section 2 we employ a preliminary analysis of both the volatility
and the magnitude of the changes in the money market rates in the days of policy meetings.
This analysis provides a straightforward and intuitive response to the hypothesis that
monetary policy meetings are special days for financial markets. Section 3 proposes two
different measures of predictability based on the money market behavior in the days of
policy meetings. First, we calculate the movements in financial markets rates relative to a
given benchmark that divides the monetary policy announcements into “correctly
anticipated” and “surprises”. This part involves an investigation of the robustness of the
results against different benchmarks, which is the strength of the approach. Second, we
estimate the financial markets reaction to monetary policy moves. This analysis enables us to
quantify the average response by financial markets to the change in the Central Banks’
policy rates. In addition, in Section 4 we estimate the statistical lead and lag properties of the
policy rates with respect to financial markets rates. This enables us to investigate how much
7
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expected changes in the key policy rate. Section 5 concludes.
2.   Are policy meetings’ days different days?
In the paper we use data from 13 countries and 1 currency union: Australia, Canada,
the Czech Republic, the euro area, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The motivation
behind the choice of sample must be seen as balancing the desire to investigate predictability
in a relatively large set of Central Banks against the availability of adequate financial
instruments to measure predictability.
2 The sample starts in 1999, when the single monetary
policy of the ECB began.
Recently, several papers have investigated how well markets are able to anticipate the
monetary policy by the Fed (Krueger and Kuttner; 1996, Poole and Rasche; 2000, Kuttner;
2001, Demiralp and Jordà; 2004) and the ECB (Gaspar et al.; 2001, Perez-Quiros and Sicilia;
2002, Ross; 2002, Bernoth and von Hagen; 2004), while Bernhardsen and Kloster (2002)
and Coppel and Connolly (2003) provided a cross-country comparison of some OECD
economies. The main finding of this literature is that market participants in industrialized
countries are nowadays better able to anticipate monetary policy decisions than in the 1980s
or early 1990s. It seems plausible to assume that the improvement in predictability is at least
in part related to the increased public availability of information about the monetary policy
strategy and how decisions are taken. Previously, secrecy was the byword in central banking.
Now, this trend has changed and there has been a clear progress towards increasing openness
and transparency during the last decade.
However, previous research reveals that there is a variety of different techniques
available to model predictability. Given our heterogeneous sample, a simple framework,
which can be easily applied to all countries, would be highly desirable. A first intuitive
                                                        
2 Data for the correct financial instruments were not readily available for several countries that otherwise
would have been included in the study, such as Brazil, Chile, Mexico and South Korea. Also note that we have
omitted Japan from the analysis, because strong deflationary pressure during the past 10 years has forced the
Bank of Japan to keep nominal interest rates close to the zero lower bound level since 1995.
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July 2005approach to measure the extent to which market participants are surprised by a monetary
policy decision is to compute the change in money market interest rates on the days of the
policy meetings. That is, the value:
1   − − = t t t i i δ ,
where  t i  is the market interest rate on the day of the meeting (using close of day data). The
rationale behind using δ as a measure of monetary policy predictability is as simple as the
following: the higher the degree to which the market anticipates the policy decision, the
more muted the response in the short-term interest rates on the day of the announcement.
Thus, not only the magnitude but also the standard deviation of the changes in the market
interest rates to policy decisions can be compared among Central Banks. In fact, when a
policy decision is correctly foreseen also the market volatility should not be influenced by
the announcement.
3
Which financial instrument should be used to measure the market response to policy
announcements? In the literature a wide range of market instruments has been used to extract
this information.
4 Every interest rate has its own advantages and disadvantages. In particular,
the existence of several sources of bias, as term premia and differences in the liquidity,
complicates the extraction of a “pure measure” of predictability, especially for very short-
term rates. Furthermore, the availability of market instruments varies substantially across
countries. In this paper, we calculate the market responses to the monetary policy decisions
using daily money market rates at 1-, 3- and 12-month maturity. These rates were readily
available for all the countries in the sample.
5
                                                        
3 While the analysis of short-term rates is mostly used in the literature, other approaches are also employed
to assess the predictability of Central Banks. For instance, Sager and Taylor (2004) analyze the news effect of
monetary policy disclosure by the ECB on the foreign exchange market, while Bomfim (2003) looks at the
influence of FED announcements on the US stock market.
4 See, for instance, Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002) for a discussion about the different instruments that can
be employed for the euro area and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) for an investigation on the relevance of the
interest rate maturity for the relationship between FED funds target rates and market interest rates in the US.
5 An alternative option would have been to consider intra-day data. However, such data were not available
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July 2005Table A1 (in the Appendix) shows the standard deviation of the daily changes in the
money market rates on the days when monetary policy meetings took place, between January
1999 and April 2004. The table also reports the standard deviation of all daily changes and
distinguishes between announcements of decisions to alter the key interest rate and “no
change” announcements.
Looking at the volatility in the 1-month market rates on the policy meeting days, it is
possible to detect a strong heterogeneity across the 14 countries. However, a standard F-test
shows that for each country, with the exception of Thailand in the 1-month market and
Poland in the 12-month market, the null hypothesis of identical variances between “normal”
days and days of policy meetings can be rejected at the 5% level of significance. This result
suggests that even in the more mature economies of the sample the volatility in the money
market on the days of policy meetings is larger than usual.
6 In addition, the market volatility
around days of meetings seems to depend on the policy decision. The standard deviation of
the changes in the money market rates when a modification in the official policy rate is
decided is significantly larger than when the monetary policy authority does not change the
official rate.
7
A second, more direct, way of investigating whether the market behavior is different
in meetings’ days is to run a regression of the (absolute) changes in the money rates on a
time dummy accounting for monetary policy meetings:
(1) ; 14 ,... 1              = + + = j D c jt jt j j jt ε θ δ
where cj is a constant and Djt is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in policy
meetings’ days and 0 elsewhere, for each country j.
It turns out that the dummy’s coefficient θ is always strongly significant all through
the sample, thus supporting the idea that the days in which the board of the monetary policy
authority meets are special days for financial markets also as concern the magnitude of the
interest rate changes.
                                                        
6 For the euro area, this result is consistent with the findings in Bernoth and von Hagen (2004), in which the
authors analyse the Euribor future rates.
7 According to the F-test, this result holds true for all countries and all maturities.
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3.1   The Hit-Rate
A first measure of Central Banks’ predictability is here constructed by comparing the
changes in the money market in the days of policy meetings to a benchmark. Changes in
excess of the benchmark would signal a “surprise” and thus the failure of the market in
anticipating the Central Bank behavior. The “hit rate” is computed as the number of times (in
per cent) the market was able to correctly anticipate the monetary policy announcement.
8
 In order to set the benchmark, and thus to identify a surprise, we use two different
measures: a) two times the standard deviation of all daily changes (regardless whether there
was a policy meeting or not) and b) 12.5 basis points. Formally, for all countries, a monetary
policy surprise is defined as:
(a)  δ σ δ 2   1 > − = − k k k i i
and/or
(b)  0125 . 0   1 > − = − k k k i i δ
where  k  refers to the day of the selected meeting and  δ σ  is the standard deviation of the
change in interest rates on all days of the sample.
Measure a) compares market rate changes around monetary policy meetings with the
general behavior of the market. A change outside the selected “confidence bands” of two
times the standard deviation is considered a significant deviation from the “normal” market
rate volatility, thus we say that the market has been surprised by the Central Bank. Measure
b), instead, is consistent with the idea that a standard monetary policy action is an increase or
a decrease of minimum 25 basis points in the policy rate. Thus, a change of more than 12.5
basis points -- 50% of the overall change -- in the market rates on the day of a monetary
policy meeting suggests that market participants were surprised by the policy
                                                        
8 The use of the hit rate is common in the literature on monetary policy predictability: see for instance
Gaspar et al. (2001), Ross (2002) and Coppel and Connolly (2003) for the setting of different benchmarks.
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9 It should also be kept in mind that the hit rate does not focus exclusively on
the markets reactions to changes in policy rates. Obviously, a surprising decision to leave
policy rates unchanged may also bring about large adjustments in financial markets rates.
Moreover, financial markets may also react to changes in the communication of the policy
decisions, such as changes in the balance of risk statement or perceived changes in the tone
made in the press release or at the press conference.
Figure 1























1-month money market rate and the rate on the main refinancing operations. 
Suprises defined according to the 12.5 basis points criterion.
Figures 1 to 3 depict the key interest rates of the ECB, the FED and the Bank of
England and the development in the 1-month money market rates in each country.
10 The
                                                        
9 Note that in the case of Hungary, Poland, South Africa and Thailand, where interest rate volatility is
relatively high, the 12.5 b.p. benchmark turns out to be the strictest criterion, while the opposite is true for the
rest of the panel.
10 Hartmann et al. (2001) and Ewerhart et al. (2004) are extensive analyses of the microstructure of the euro
provided by Bartolini et al. (2002) and Demiralp and Farley (2005), while in the attempt of modelling the daily
econometric specifications. In addition, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2003) provide a study of the interdependence
between announcements of policy changes in the US and euro area. For the UK see Haldane and Read (2000)
and Clare and Courtenay (2001).
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area money market; broad analyses of the functioning of the interbank money market in the US are
behaviour of the FED funds rate, Sarno et al. (2005) have analysed the forecasting properties of severalwhite circles represent the meetings of the ECB’s Governing Council, the FED’s Federal
Open Market Committee and the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee in which the
policy announcement was correctly predicted by the market (using the 12.5 basis points
criterion), while the black circles are those dates in which a surprise arose, regardless of
whether the decision was to change or not the policy rate.
It is possible to see that for the euro area the black circles are “concentrated” in the
first part of the graph only (Figure 1). In particular, the last surprise by the Governing



























1-month money market rate and the target for the federal funds rate. 
Suprises defined according to the 12.5 basis points criterion.
Monetary policy and market interest rates in the United States
As for the FED, Figure 2 shows a particular feature of the US money market: the
surprises in the 1-month rate concern only the days in which a change in the target for the
federal funds rate was decided. All the announcements of a “no change” were correctly
                                                        
11 The “surprise” dates here identified are exactly the same Perez-Quiroz and Sicilia (2002) detected
analyzing the jumps in the EONIA rate.
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1-month money market rate and the official  repo  rate. 
Suprises defined according to the 12.5 basis points criterion.
Monetary policy and market interest rates in the United Kingdom
Table A2a and A2b (in the Appendix) report the hit rate for the 14 countries using the
1-, 3- and 12-month money market interest rates. The value of the hit rate is shown for both
definitions of the benchmark. Furthermore, the tables distinguish between meetings in which
the policy rate was changed and meetings in which the decision was not to change it. Before
analyzing the data in detail, two general features might be noted. First, there is not a Central
Bank which is the most predictable according to the two benchmarks and for all interest rate
maturities. Second, confirming the results of the analysis of the volatility in Section 2,
decisions of not changing the policy rate are generally better foreseen than decisions of
changing the rate.
According to the ranking provided by the overall hit rate in the case of the 12.5 basis
points criterion, the euro area has the best score: financial markets were able to correctly
                                                        
12 See, for instance, Ross (2002) for a similar result.
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follow closely with a hit rate of 91%, while the Bank of England performs slightly worse
than the ECB and the FED with a value of the index of 84%.
The predictability of a “no change” decision is almost perfect in the euro area,
regardless of the market interest rate considered. Out of the 85 meetings in which the
decision of the Governing Council was not to change the key interest rate, there were only
two surprises as measured by the 1-month interest rate (and one surprise as measured by the
3-month and the 12-month rates).
13 Only Switzerland has a record of 100% “no change”
decisions detected in advance in all the three interest rate maturities. The US follows closely
with only one surprise in the 12-month rates.
14 However, both Switzerland and the US
witnessed a much smaller number of meetings than the euro area over the period under
analysis (24 and 45, respectively, vs. 100). Also the UK perform fairly well with a hit rate of
91%. As for lower degrees of predictability, a value of the index below 90% in at least one
of the market rates is recorded in both industrialized countries (Canada, New Zealand and
Norway) and emerging economies (Poland, South Africa and Thailand).
When considering the meetings in which a decision to change the policy rate has been
made, the hit rate drops significantly. Focusing again on the 1-month rates and the 12.5 basis
points definition, the hit rate ranges from 24% in South Africa to 85% in Canada. In the euro
area 73% of the changes in the rate were correctly predicted by each market, i.e. 4 times out
of 15 the market was surprised by the ECB’s decision to move the key rate. Comparing these
results with those of other industrialized economies we can see that the euro area hit rate is
above those from New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and UK (ranging from 42%
to 70%) and below those from Australia, Canada and the US (from 79% to 85%).
The ranking of the industrialized countries is almost unchanged also according to the
definition of the hit rate based on 2 times the standard deviation (Table A2b). However, as
expected, the degree of predictability increases strongly in those countries in which the
                                                        
13 This result is in line with the findings in Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002), which identify a hit rate of 94%
when the two-week EONIA swap money market is used over the shorter period from 1 January 1999 to 7 June
2002.
14 Predictability of 100% in at least one market is also recorded in Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Sweden and the UK.
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general index, the euro area performs slightly better than the US and the UK (87% vs. 80%
and 73%, respectively).
3.2   The money market adjustment
A second indicator of predictability is based on the estimated measure of the financial
markets reaction to monetary policy moves. In particular, we regress the daily changes in the
1-month money market rate,  jt i ∆  for country j, on a constant, α , and the changes in the key
policy rate,  jt p ∆ :
(2)  jt jt j j jt p i ε γ α + ∆ + = ∆ .
The estimated coefficients on the policy changes are presented in Table 1.
15 The
intuition behind this technique is analogous to the volatility/magnitude analysis performed in
the previous sections. A low value of γ  implies a small market response to the policy
announcement, thus suggesting that the market was already pricing-in and thus anticipating
the monetary policy decision. The main difference is that equation (2) focuses on anticipated
changes in the policy rates and takes into account the differences in the average size of
policy moves among Central Banks.
Except for South Africa and Thailand the γ -coefficient is of the expected sign and
significant all through the sample.
16 In particular, Australia and Canada show the lowest
coefficients, while Hungary and then the Czech Republic the highest. This suggests that the
market participants in Australia and Canada are able to predict the outcome of the Central
Banks policy decisions relatively well, with a response on the days of the policy change of
                                                        
15 As expected, the constant is not significantly different from zero in any country. In addition, because the
error term cannot be expected to be “white noise”, the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-
consistent standard errors of each coefficient are reported in the table.
16 In the case of South Africa the coefficient is not significantly different from zero, while for Thailand it is
not significant and negative, a result which is at odds with the theory. The reason is likely to be that the money
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European countries, responding by between 52% to 84% of the policy change.
Table 1
MARKET RESPONSE TO MONETARY POLICY MOVES
Country Rate changes Estimates of γ
(1)(2) Wald test 
(2)(3)
Australia 15 0.17** 0.01
(0.06)
Canada 19 0.17* --
(0.07)
Czech Republic 21 0.52** 345.6**
(0.10)
Euro area 15 0.26** 16.98**
(0.09)
Hungary 26 0.84** 368.1**
(0.11)
New Zealand 18 0.26* 7.18**
(0.09)
Norway 21 0.21** 1.81
(0.07)
Poland 25 0.38** 29.28**
(0.13)
South Africa 14 0.02 --
(0.13)
Sweden 16 0.37** 172.2**
(0.09)
Switzerland 10 0.28** 18.64**
(0.07)
Thailand 5 -0.30 --
(0.25)
United Kingdom 19 0.29** 10.72**
(0.09)
United States 19 0.27** 25.51**
(0.11)
(1) Newey-West standard errors in brackets; – (2) * and ** represent significance at 5% and
1%, respectively. – (3) Null hypothesis: γ for Canada equals γ  for the rest of the countries.
Given the apparent large heterogeneity of the response to a monetary policy change
we run a Wald test to check whether the differences in the γ  coefficients are statistically
significant across countries. In particular, we tested the null hypothesis that the value of γ  for
17
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Australia and Norway (at the 1% level of significance). Thus suggesting that together with
Canada the latter two countries perform very well in anticipating the monetary policy
decision of the Central Bank. For the rest of the panel, the coefficients are significantly
different at the 5% level, hinting to a lower degree of predictability (see the last column of
Table 1).
In order to “rank” the ECB, using the same test, we also investigated whether the
coefficient for the euro area is statistically different from the one of the other countries. The
null hypothesis of identical values cannot be rejected for Norway, New Zealand, US, UK
and Switzerland at the 5% level, but is rejected for Australia and Canada (indicating that the
ECB is less predictable) and for Sweden, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic
(indicating that the ECB is more predictable). Thus the finding of a comparable degree of
predictability among ECB, FED and Bank of England is again confirmed by equation (2).
4. Market anticipation and pass-through of monetary policy
In this section we propose an econometric analysis of the relationship between the
key policy rate and the money market rates over a longer period before the Central Bank’s
meetings, in order asses how much in advance the market is able to price-in the expected
monetary policy decision.
The results from regression (2), as well as all the analysis so far, rely exclusively on
the information from market rates on the day of the monetary policy authority meeting and
the day before. This may be in some instances insufficient, because we do not know when
the market started pricing-in a change in the key rate. In fact, one runs the risk of concluding
that market participants are perfectly anticipating a change in the official rate in situations in
which the expectations are adjusted in a discrete way only one or two days before the policy
meeting. This might happen if Central Bank officials, for instance via speeches or public
statements, provide the public with an obvious hint about what they intend to do at the
forthcoming meeting.
A way to control for this problem is to examine how much of the actual change is
already priced-in by financial markets over the two weeks before the policy announcement.
18
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month market interest rate  jt i  and the key policy rate  jt p  for country  j  as a function of a
constant  j 0 β , and the change in the key policy rate  jt p ∆ , led by 1, 5 and 10 business days,
and lagged by 5 business days:
(3)  jt jt j jt j jt j jt j j jt jt p p p p p i ε β β β β β + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = − − + + + 5 4 10 3 5 2 1 1 0 .
The coefficients β 1j, β 2j and β 3j can be interpreted as estimates of the degree to which
the market has already priced-in the policy change one day, one week and two weeks ahead
of the meeting, respectively. A value of zero would indicate that changes in the rate were
generally unexpected by the market at those dates. On the contrary, a large value of the
coefficients would suggest that the market was able to correctly anticipate (well in advance)
the decisions to change the key interest rates. However, while β 1j can be directly taken as the
share of the policy change that was anticipated by market participants one day before the
meeting, β 2j and β 3j should be interpreted more cautiously. In fact, the one month interest
rate reflects the expected average interest rate over the coming month and thus includes
expectations of an unchanged key rate prior to the policy meeting and a different rate (lower
or higher) afterwards. Finally, the coefficient β 4j can be interpreted as a measure of the pass-
through of the key policy rate to market rates within a week after the move. A value close to
zero would indicate that the changes in policy rates are fully passed-trough in the 1-month
money market rates in 5 business days.
In Table 2 we report the estimated values of the coefficients from equation (3) and the
Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors for the whole
set of countries under analysis. The standard tests suggest that while the 1-day anticipation
coefficient is highly significant in each of the 14 countries, the 5-day coefficient is less
significant in Hungary and South Africa (5% and 10%, respectively) and it is not significant
in Poland. At the same time, the 10-day coefficient is only weakly or non-significant in all
the emerging market economies and in Switzerland. Excluding the countries where at least
one of the policy anticipation coefficients is not significant, the table show that β 1j, β 2j and
β 3j are relatively similar across the panel. They are the highest in Australia and Canada, and
the lowest in Hungary. As expected, they are decreasing with respect to distance of the
19
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degree of pricing-in by the market.
Table 2
REGRESSION RESULTS






Australia 15 0.94*** 0.61*** 0.42*** 0.12*** 0.17
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Canada 19 0.78*** 0.59*** 0.43*** 0.05** 0.16
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02)
Czech Republic 21 0.41*** 0.33*** 0.11 0.15 0.14
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
Euro area 15 0.72*** 0.50*** 0.33*** 0.01 0.14
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05)
Hungary 26 0.24*** 0.05** 0.10* 0.23** 0.02
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.11)
New Zealand 18 0.84*** 0.70*** 0.48*** 0.14*** 0.08
(0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04)
Norway 21 0.72*** 0.56*** 0.39*** -0.02 0.10
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06)
Poland 25 0.49*** 0.01 0.01 -0.15 0.04
(0.16) (0.17) (0.10) (0.07)
South Africa 14 0.62*** 0.25* 0.12 -0.38 0.01
(0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (0.17)
Sweden 16 0.53*** 0.39*** 0.23*** -0.02 0.14
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Switzerland 10 0.31*** 0.19*** 0.08 -0.30 0.02
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Thailand 5 1.62*** 1.51*** 0.46 1.38*** 0.01
(0.13) (0.13) (0.29) (0.07)
United Kingdom 19 0.66*** 0.43*** 0.33*** 0.07 0.08
(0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)
United States 19 0.79*** 0.60*** 0.36*** 0.16 0.18
(0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
(1) Newey-West standard errors in brackets; *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively. – (2) Null hypothesis: γ for Canada equals γ  for the rest of the
countries.
As for the lag-indicators, Table 2 suggests that while the policy moves have generally
been fully passed-through within a week, there are some significant β 4j coefficients. A
positive coefficient as in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US might suggests that
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month.
Concluding, it can be stated, with all the caution that is needed when directly
comparing regression coefficients, that the degree of policy moves anticipation in the euro
area is around the average of industrialized economies and in line with Central Banks with a
longer history such as the FED and the Bank of England.
5. Conclusion
Historically, for a variety of reasons, Central Banks have chosen different ways of
communicating with the public and have relied on different instruments to be transparent. In
addition, in the economic literature there are different views about the optimal degree of
transparency. In some studies, like Eijffinger and Geraats (2002) and Gros (2002),
transparency is identified with the amount and/or the degree of precision of information that
Central Banks release to the public. According to other views, what is important, instead, is
that the Central Bank provides the public with a clear explanation of the reasoning behind
the decisions taken. It follows that openness, and thus the release of information, is desirable
only to the extent to which it enhances the understanding of the Central Bank behavior.
17
However, over the past decade, it has come to be widely accepted that transparency
in monetary policy–making is highly desirable, since the effectiveness of monetary impulses
improves when financial markets understand how the Central Bank conducts the monetary
policy and why decisions are taken. In particular, better information by market participants
about Central Bank actions and intentions increases the degree to which monetary authorities
can actually affect market’s expectations about future changes in the official rate and thus
about long-term interest rates. This paper has examined the predictability, i.e. the ability of
financial markets in anticipating monetary policy decisions, of 14 different Central Banks
with various monetary policy frameworks and different ways of communicating to the
public.
                                                        
17 See Winkler (2000), Woodford (2003), Thornton (2003) and Issing (2004) among others.
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associated with this kind of direct comparison. In particular, the properties of the financial
instruments used to evaluate market expectations about future policy decisions may vary
across countries. Different types of liquidity, term and risk premia may affect the findings
obtained in the exercises performed in this study. Another factor, which is worth mentioning,
is the evolution in the macroeconomic environment occurred in the period under review.  A
large part of the overall increase in predictability in some countries over the last decade has
probably been due to a lower general level of interest rates, as inflation levels have fallen
and greater macroeconomic stability has been achieved. This makes it difficult to isolate
with precision the contribution of the increased transparency in Central Banks behavior in
reducing the volatility in short-term rates. Finally, a third caveat concerns the span of our
time sample, which, in order to include the euro area, is relatively short. However, even if
the analysis of the money market dynamics started in January 1999, the number of policy
meetings and interest rates changes were large enough for the standard statistical exercises to
be performed.
Using money market rates at different maturities we reached two results. First, by
comparing measures of the magnitude and the volatility of the changes in the money markets
rates in the days of the policy meetings, we showed that the days in which policy decisions
are taken are special days for financial markets. Second, according to two different measures
of predictability and via an assessment of the ability of financial agents in incorporating well
in advance the policy decisions into market rates, we showed that the overall predictability
of the ECB is in line with that of our two “benchmarks”: the FED and the Bank of England.
Our findings fit well with other recent contributions, especially about the euro area.
In fact our results are fully consistent with works employing somewhat different kinds of
analysis and relying on different measures of predictability such as the studies by Perez-
Quiros and Sicilia (2002), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2003) and Bernoth and von Hagen
(2004). In addition, also the international ranking of the ECB with respect to other Central
Banks and in particular the comparison with the FED and the Bank of England is confirmed
by several sources (Ross, 2002; Coppell and Connolly, 2003).
Future extensions of the work may point to assess whether some specific
characteristics of the monetary policy and communication strategy of a Central Bank have
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July 2005influence on its predictability. For instance, while all the countries in our sample have the
price stability as central part of their policy objective, the ECB, the Swiss National Bank and
the FED are the only Central Banks without a formal inflation target. A possible exercise
could evaluate whether inflation target countries are more predictable than others. In
addition, also other and modalities of the policy framework, like the publication of the
minutes of the meetings and the voting record, may be assessed.
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All data are daily (close of day) money market rates (one-month, three-month and
twelve-month). The sample starts on 4 January 1999, except for Hungary, South Africa and
Thailand for which it starts in January 2000 and ends on 15 April 2004. Below we report for
each country the exact money market interest rates considered and the source.
Australia:  Money market rates: IPAUS. Source: Global Financial Database
Canada:  Money market rates: IPCAN. Source: Global Financial Database
Czech Republic: Money market rates: PRIBOR. Source: Global Financial Database
Euro area: Money market rates: EURIBOR. Source: Global Financial Database
Hungary: Money market rates: Interbank rates. Source: DataStream
New Zealand: Money market rates: Interbank rates. Source: DataStream
Norway: Money market rates: OIBOR. Source: Global Financial Database
Poland: Money market rates: Interbank rates. Source: DataStream
South Africa: Money market rates: Interbank rates. Source: DataStream
Sweden: Money market rates: STIBOR. Source: Global Financial Database
Switzerland: Money market rates: IBCHE. Source: Global Financial Database
Thailand: Money market rates: IBTHA. Source: Global Financial Database
UK: Money market rates: IBGBR. Source: Global Financial Database
US: Money market rates: Interbank rates. Source: DataStream
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Meetings
(1) Maturity All days All meetings Changes Non-changes
Australia 58 1-month 2.5 6.1 9.1 4.5
(26%) 3-month 3.1 5.6 8.6 3.6
12-month 4.5 6.3 8.6 4.9
Canada 35 1-month 2.3 9.7 10.8 6.0
(74%) 3-month 2.9 8.1 9.0 4.5
12-month 4.7 7.9 8.8 4.9
Czech Republic 68 1-month 3.7 13.1 16.7 0.9
(31%) 3-month 3.5 9.1 12.2 0.4
12-month 4.1 8.0 11.6 0.9
Euro area 100 1-month 2.6 6.8 15.4 3.4
(15%) 3-month 2.4 5.6 12.6 2.5
12-month 3.3 5.8 10.6 4.3
Hungary 37 1-month 20.1 72.9 88.8 3.9
(68%) 3-month 16.3 62.3 75.5 15.4
12-month 16.0 58.2 70.4 16.6
New Zealand 41 1-month 4.1 10.7 15.4 3.2
(44%) 3-month 4.0 11.3 16.0 4.4
12-month 4.6 12.4 15.7 8.7
Norway 48 1-month 6.2 16.5 21.3 9.5
(44%) 3-month 4.8 13.9 17.9 8.0
12-month 5.3 13.9 16.7 10.0
Poland 50 1-month 20.0 41.8 60.3 12.0
(50%) 3-month 15.4 31.2 43.7 12.3
12-month 19.1 22.5 30.1 13.1
South Africa 29 1-month 24.1 32.6 45.3 16.2
(48%) 3-month 14.4 25.1 34.5 11.1
12-month 14.6 25.8 35.3 11.9
Sweden 55 1-month 2.4 8.8 15.2 3.8
(29%) 3-month 2.6 7.4 12.5 3.3
12-month 3.5 6.7 10.0 4.6
Switzerland 24 1-month 3.8 12.4 16.6 2.1
(50%) 3-month 3.7 11.7 15.8 2.0
12-month 3.5 8.9 11.5 2.6
Thailand 34 1-month 17.1 14.5 27.2 10.3
(15%) 3-month 9.9 13.1 19.3 12.1
12-month 7.6 10.8 13.7 10.3
United Kingdom 64 1-month 3.2 8.4 12.2 5.3
(28%) 3-month 2.5 7.0 11.5 3.1
12-month 3.9 8.3 12.8 5.3
United States 45 1-month 2.9 12.3 18.3 0.9
(42%) 3-month 3.1 10.0 14.4 1.2
12-month 4.7 9.4 12.8 4.5
Sample: January 1999 - April 2004.
(1) Percentage of changes in brackets.
Standard deviation in basis points
VOLATILITY IN THE MONEY MARKET RATES
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Meetings
(1) Maturity All meeting Changes Non-changes
Australia 58 1-month 91% 80% 95%
(26%) 3-month 96% 87% 100%
12-month 91% 73% 98%
Canada 35 1-month 86% 85% 89%
(74%) 3-month 89% 89% 89%
12-month 86% 81% 100%
Czech Republic 68 1-month 76% 40% 98%
(31%) 3-month 84% 50% 100%
12-month 85% 60% 100%
Euro area 100 1-month 94% 73% 98%
(15%) 3-month 95% 73% 99%
12-month 95% 73% 99%
Hungary 37 1-month 49% 24% 100%
(68%) 3-month 49% 28% 92%
12-month 51% 32% 92%
New Zealand 41 1-month 84% 70% 96%
(44%) 3-month 84% 70% 96%
12-month 72% 60% 83%
Norway 48 1-month 73% 62% 81%
(44%) 3-month 75% 62% 85%
12-month 73% 57% 85%
Poland 50 1-month 65% 50% 85%
(50%) 3-month 76% 71% 88%
12-month 71% 63% 77%
South Africa 29 1-month 40% 21% 67%
(48%) 3-month 57% 36% 80%
12-month 60% 50% 80%
Sweden 55 1-month 88% 63% 98%
(29%) 3-month 96% 88% 100%
12-month 96% 88% 100%
Switzerland 24 1-month 71% 42% 100%
(50%) 3-month 71% 42% 100%
12-month 83% 67% 100%
Thailand 34 1-month 80% 60% 83%
(15%) 3-month 77% 40% 83%
12-month 89% 80% 90%
United Kingdom 64 1-month 84% 61% 93%
(28%) 3-month 89% 61% 100%
12-month 89% 72% 96%
United States 45 1-month 91% 79% 100%
(42%) 3-month 89% 74% 100%
12-month 87% 68% 98%
Sample: January 1999 - April 2004.
(1) Percentage of changes in brackets.
HIT RATE: 12.5 BASIS POINTS CRITERION
26
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 504
July 2005Table A2b
Meetings
(1) Maturity All meeting Changes Non-changes
Australia 58 1-month 71% 40% 81%
(26%) 3-month 78% 40% 90%
12-month 86% 60% 95%
Canada 35 1-month 77% 74% 89%
(74%) 3-month 80% 78% 89%
12-month 80% 78% 89%
Czech Republic 68 1-month 68% 14% 93%
(31%) 3-month 78% 32% 100%
12-month 82% 50% 98%
Euro area 100 1-month 87% 47% 95%
(15%) 3-month 87% 47% 94%
12-month 89% 67% 93%
Hungary 37 1-month 73% 62% 100%
(68%) 3-month 70% 62% 92%
12-month 70% 62% 92%
New Zealand 41 1-month 79% 60% 96%
(44%) 3-month 79% 60% 96%
12-month 65% 50% 78%
Norway 48 1-month 73% 62% 81%
(44%) 3-month 73% 57% 85%
12-month 65% 52% 74%
Poland 50 1-month 88% 77% 96%
(50%) 3-month 90% 81% 96%
12-month 92% 86% 96%
South Africa 29 1-month 87% 71% 100%
(48%) 3-month 83% 64% 100%
12-month 83% 64% 100%
Sweden 55 1-month 72% 38% 88%
(29%) 3-month 75% 63% 83%
12-month 86% 88% 85%
Switzerland 24 1-month 58% 17% 100%
(50%) 3-month 67% 34% 100%
12-month 62% 25% 100%
Thailand 34 1-month 91% 60% 97%
(15%) 3-month 86% 40% 93%
12-month 94% 80% 97%
United Kingdom 64 1-month 73% 58% 80%
(28%) 3-month 78% 53% 89%
12-month 80% 68% 84%
United States 45 1-month 80% 53% 100%
(42%) 3-month 80% 53% 100%
12-month 82% 63% 94%
Sample: January 1999 - April 2004.
(1) Percentage of changes in brackets.
HIT RATE: 2 TIMES STANDARD DEVIATION CRITERION
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